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A B S T R A C T
This paper aims to examine changes and continuities in terms of
actors and policies in the global health governance on coronaviruses
in order to understand the available tools, the characters and the
extent they meet the required responses of a pandemic. In doing so,
this paper examines actors and policies in the governance of three
occurrences of coronaviruses, i.e. SARS, MERS, and the COVID-
19. Actors and policies are mapped based on its function in a
pandemic: (a) surveillance and knowledge dissemination, (b)
material and financial assistance both for emergency and long term
purposes, and (c) rule-making behavior. This paper found that the
larger scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has led more actors
involved in the global governance of COVID-19 than during MERS
and SARS. WHO still dominates the surveillance and knowledge
dissemination as well as rule making leadership. It also leads in
providing material assistance to affected countries. Yet, with the
significant impacts to global economy, global financial institutions
dominate the provision of financial assistance both for short term
and long term commitment. This imbalanced crowd in this last
aspect, therefore, causes a changing dominant approach of the GHG
on coronaviruses from the previously dominating evidence-based
scientific approach to economic approach.
A B S T R A K
Paper ini bertujuan untuk melihat perubahan dan keberlanjutan
dalam hal aktor dan kebijakan tata kelola global terkait virus
Corona yang diharapkan dapat membantu memahami sarana-sarana
yang ada, karakteristiknya, dan seberapa jauh sarana tersebut
memenuhi prasyarat respons terhadap pandemik. Untuk tujuan
tersebut, paper ini melihat aktor dan kebijakan pada tiga kejadian
virus Corona, yaitu SARS, MERS, and COVID-19. Aktor dan
kebijakan dipetakan berdasarkan fungsinya dalam merespon
pandemic yaitu: (a) penyebaran informasi dan pengawasan, (b)
bantuan finansial dan material baik untuk kondisi darurat maupun
jangka panjang, dan (c) perilaku pembuatan aturan. Tulisan ini
menemukan bahwa skala besar COVID-19 membuat lebih banyak
aktor terlibat dalam tata kelola global selama pandemic COVID-19
dibandingkan dengan saat MERS dan SARS. WHO masih
mendominasi dalam penyebaran informasi dan pengawasan serta
pembuatan aturan. WHO juga memimpin dalam penyediaan
bantuan material kepada negara yang membutuhkan. Meskipun
demikian, dengan besarnya dampak terhadap perekonomian global,
institusi keuangan global mendominasi dalam penyediaan bantuan
finansial baik untuk jangka pendek dan panjang. Fokus pada aspek
terakhir ini oleh karenanya, menyebabkan pergeseran dalam hal
pendekatan dominan tata kelola global virus Corona, dari yang
sebelumnya didominasi oleh pendekatan ilmiah berbasis bukti
menjadi pendekatan ekonomi.
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Introduction
The reported outbreak of a novel
coronaviruses (later named as COVID-19) in
Wuhan, Hubei Province, China on January 7,
2020 was soon declared by the WHO as a
pandemic on March 11, 2020 as it spread
rapidly to 114 countries and affecting
118,000 people around the globe.1 As
defined by the WHO, pandemic is a phase in
the spread of infectious disease that is
characterized by “community level outbreak
in at least one country in a different WHO
region”.2 In other words, the disease has
spread to other parts of the world outside the
origin region, or in this case Asia (Western
Pacific). In fact, as of April 8, 2020 or three
months after the outbreak, the impacts of the
pandemic reached 1.3 million people with
74,304 death in 204 countries.3 This number
far exceeded the SARS outbreak in 2003
which was also caused by coronaviruses
(SARS CoV) that affected 26 countries, 8096
people with 774 deaths.4 Meanwhile, H1N1
(Swine Flu) Pandemic in 2009 has affected
134,000 people with 816 death in the first
three months before it reached its post
1 WHO, (2020a), 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-
nCoV): Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan,
Geneva: WHO; WHO, (2020g, March 11). WHO
Director-General's opening remarks at the media
briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020. Retrieved




2 WHO(c). (n.d.). Current WHO phase of pandemic
alert for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Retrieved April
2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/phase/en/
3 WHO, (2020b, April 8), Coronavirus (COVID-19),
Retrieved from WHO: https://who.sprinklr.com
4 J. Mackenzie & A. Merianos (2013), The legacies of
SARS – international preparedness and readiness to
respond to future threats in the Western Pacific
Region, Western Pacific Surveillance and Response
Journal, 4(3), 1-5.
pandemic with estimated 18,449 deaths in
214 countries according to the WHO report.5
The relatively higher number of cases
and death resulting from the COVID-19 have
raised serious concerns among all decision
makers around the world. Moreover,
different from influenza virus, there has been
no specific drug and vaccine to respond
effectively to the virus. The far rapid
movement of people, goods, services, and
capital across countries also made the
COVID-19 pandemic far more complex than
SARS CoV in 2003 as it increases not only
the spread of the virus but also the
devastating impacts of the pandemic on the
global economy. It is even more concerning
that the firstly affected countries by the
current pandemic are developed countries
with China being the first epicenter, the
United States as being the most affected, and
many European countries dominating the rest
of the top ten most affected countries in the
first three months.
The implication is that the engine of
global economy will be severely affected by
the pandemic which will most likely
spillover to developing and least developed
countries with no less severe impact. This is
so because governments in developing and
least developed countries have even less
financial and technical capacity to detect,
report, and treat cases. And currently, with
the slowing global economy, capital outflow,
aid suspension, lock down and trade
restriction from more developed countries,
financial burden for these countries becomes
overwhelming to deal with the crisis.
Another serious implication is that major
powers who usually provide global
leadership are domestically occupied and
thus reducing their ability to offer leadership
5 WHO, (2009, July 27), Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
update 59, Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_07_27/en/; WHO,
(2010, August 6), Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 update 112,
Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2010_08_06/en/
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for “global war” against the pandemic.
Leadership is important as theoretically,
pandemic is a collective action problem
which solution requires cooperation and
coordinated action by all actors at all levels.
And, under severe enforcement problem, that
is when the possibility for states to defect
from cooperation is higher, a strong
leadership or institution becomes more
desirable.6
It is at this point that discussion on
the global health governance gains its
importance as it means that it is currently the
only available tool at our disposal at the
global level to fight the pandemic amidst the
absence of leadership. Yet, global
governance is a complex issue which
requires understanding in itself. Global
governance in general emerges as an
approach to understand order, stability, and
peace in the anarchic international society
amid the absence of global government. The
proposed answer to this question is the
existence of global governance referring to
“the broad range of rules and actors that
make up the international regime on an
issue”.7 It includes both “formal and
informal, explicit and implicit, regulative and
constitutive, state and non-state actors”.8 The
emphasis on issue is important given that
there is no single global governance for the
world as rules and actors will be different
among issues. Therefore, there are global
health governance, global economic
governance, global environmental
governance etc. Even global health
governance itself is still broad and dynamic.
McInness et.al., for example, categorize
global health governance (GHG) into several
6 S.B. Pertiwi (2020, March 27), Indonesia’s Virus
Response and What It Tells Us About Global Health




7 I. Hurd, (2014), International Organizations:
Politics, Law, Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
8 Ibid.
sub-global health governance consisting of
GHG on infectious diseases, GHG on non-
communicable diseases, and GHG on
distributive issues (such as access to
medicine).9 Interestingly, each of this GHG
involved different actors and are often
framed differently by those actors which then
shaped different approach to tackle the issue.
As McInnes et.al. (2014) observed in their
book, the crowd of actors in GHG has led to
competing ideas on how to approach the
problem with five dominant framing in the
GHG are evidence-based medicine, human
rights, economics, security and development.
GHG on infectious diseases that is
relevant for the discussion here, for example,
involve different actors and is framed
differently when dealing with pandemic
influenza and HIV/AIDs. GHG on pandemic
influenza has been mostly framed in the
traditional evidence-based medicine (EBM)
approach.10 This is related to the long history
of influenza in human history, the low
fatality rate, and the ability of international
organization under the leadership of the
WHO to control the diseases through its
surveillance and vaccine programs.
Therefore, global response towards the
pandemic influenza has been dominated by
scientific medical approach that is well
established and relatively unchanged until
now. The GHG on pandemic HIV/AIDS, on
the other hand, has been framed also and
mostly as human rights issue as it affected
mostly on specific groups of people such as
prostitutes, homosexuals, and many in Africa
which contribute to stigmatization to these
groups of people.11 The issue was also being
related to gender, education, and
development and thus the GHG on
HIV/AIDS involves various actors both from
9 C. McInnes, A. Kamradt-Scott, A., K. Lee, A.
Roemer-Mahler, S. Rushton, & O. Williams. (2014),
The Transformation of Global Health Governance,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid; T. Weiss & R. Thakur, (2010), Global
Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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health and non-health sectors and both from
IGOs and NGOs. Examples of these actors
are the WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP,
UNODC, UNESCO, ILO, the World Food
Program, the UN Population Fund, the
World Bank/IMF, Clinton Foundation, Bill
and Melinda Gates, Oxfam and individual
celebrity initiatives.12 The WHO is also no
longer the leading actor as the UN
established a new coordinating body -the
UNAIDS – to specifically coordinate global
efforts to deal with the HIV/AIDS.13
In regards to the COVID-19
pandemic, the following question is then
how is the characteristics of the global health
governance on coronaviruses? Who are the
main actors and what are their policies?
These questions are important not only
because few, if none, have developed
mapping on the global health governance on
coronaviruses which of course has different
characteristics from Influenza and HIV/AIDs
and thus important for theoretical
development, but understanding the
characteristics of the GHG on coronaviruses
will also help us understand the tools that are
available at the global level to fight the
pandemic. The COVID-19, however, is not
the first occurrence of coronaviruses. There
were previously two other occurrences of
coronaviruses in the form of SARS in 2002
and MERS in 2012. Understanding the
global governance of coronaviruses,
therefore, requires understanding on changes
and continuities in the emerging global
governance in these three occurrences. It is
against this background that this study aims
to contribute in examining changes and
continuities in terms of actors and policies of
the global health governance on
coronaviruses that is expected to better
understand the available tools, their
characteristics, and the extent they meet the
required response of a pandemic.




In examining changes and
continuities of GHG on coronaviruses, this
paper, first of all, identifies actors and
policies in the three occurrences of
coronaviruses, that is during SARS, MERS,
and the COVID-19 with the last mentioned is
limited to the first three months of the
pandemic that is when this paper is written.
As global governance refers to “the exercise
of authority across national borders as well
as consented norms and rules beyond the
nation state, both of them justified with
reference to common goods or transnational
problems”,14 this paper bases the mapping of
actors on the function of governance that is
related to the rule-making and norm-setting
during a pandemic. In this regards, Mark W.
Zacher and Tania J. Keefe (2008) have
identified key strategies commonly used by
actors in GHG on infectious diseases that
could be used as parameters of governance
during a pandemic.15 These parameters are
essentially in line with the WHO’s Strategic
Preparedness and Response Plan for the
2019 Novel Coronavirus containing the
required preparedness and response plan to
fight the pandemic.16 Quoted from Zacher
and Keefe, these required
responses/strategies include:
1) “Promoting surveillance of
infectious disease and disseminating
knowledge of their impacts”
2) “Providing financial and material
assistance for emergency
interventions and long-term health
improvement program”, and
3) “Adopting rules that prescribe and
proscribe particular behaviors”
14 M. Zürn (2018), A Theory of Global Governance:
Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
15 M. Zacher, & T. Keefe, (2008), The Politics of
Global Health Governance: United by Contagion,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
16 WHO, (2005), International Health Regulations
(2005) (Third Edition), Geneva: WHO.
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Based on this parameter, the first
governing activity during pandemic involves
information gathering on the outbreak of
infectious disease, the sources, and the
consequence of the outbreak and
disseminating this knowledge to all relevant
actors.17 The first activity, therefore, requires
transparency on both the affected countries
and people as well as the international
organization responsible for this
dissemination. The presence of alternative
sources of information is also important and
will be a sign of greater accountability and
good governance. The second governing
activity involves the provision of both short
term emergency relief to deal with the
pandemic in terms of material assistance,
such as medical equipment and financial
assistance such as emergency fund, as well
as long term assistance to establish a better
health care system and infrastructure as a
preventive measure for the future outbreak.
The last activity is rule-making and norm-
setting that prescribes or constrains behavior.
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper,
leadership is important to ensure obedience
and cooperation from all actors to prevent
the spread of the virus. Thus, there must be
institution/state which could issue hard law
or soft law, rules or norms that could
sufficiently help to coordinate actions among
actors.
Based on this mapping, this paper
then examines changes and continuities in
terms of actors and policies across the three
occurrences of coronaviruses. Using the
above mentioned parameters not only helps
in identifying the available tools in the GHG
of coronaviruses along with its
characteristics but also the extent it meets the
required responses or basic governance
activities during pandemic.
17 M. Zacher, & T. Keefe, The Politics of Global
Health Governance, 16.
Result
The result of this research is presented in
Table 1. This table provides summary on the
characteristics of the outbreak and the
emerging GHG during SARS (2002-2003),
MERS (2012-2019), and COVID-19 (2019)
from which this study draws analysis on the
pattern of changes and continuities of the
GHG on coronaviruses and the extent it
meets the required response in each
occurrence.
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Origin Country Guangdong, China Saudi Arabia Wuhan, China
Number of Cases 8096-8,422 2,494 (11/2019) 1.3 million
(4/8/2020)
Death Rate 774-916 (11%) 858 (34.4%)
(11/2019)
74,304 (4/8/2020)
Global Coverage (countries) 26-29 27 (11/2019) 204 (4/8/2020)
Global Responses


























2c) Providing long-term financial assistance WB - WB
2d) Providing long-term material assistance WB -




Sources: Maackenzie & Merianos, 2013; WHO, 2019a; Park, Thwaites, & Openshaw, 2020
Discussion
GHG during The Past Coronaviruses
Outbreak
Severely Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
The Severely Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) was the first major case of
coronaviruses outbreak in the modern era. It
emerged in November 2002 in Foshan City,
Guangdong Province, China in the mid of
November 2002. The Outbreak occurred in
seven separate municipalities with 20
transmission in each chain.18 The outbreak
began to spread to hospital staffs in January
2003 and peaked in February 2003 with 40
18 D. Heymann & G. Rodier, (2004), SARS: A Global
Response To An International Threat, Brown Journal
of World Affairs, X(2), 186-196.
new cases per day totaling 1,512 cases
during this local outbreak.19 The disease,
however, began to spread internationally
when one doctor from this area travelled to
Hongkong in February and affecting at least
16 people from which this disease spread
further to Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada
until it reached its peak in May 2003 with
8096-8422 cases and 772-916 deaths in 26-
29 countries before the WHO declared its
triumph in controlling the disease in July
2003.20
Observed from the beginning of the
crisis, the GHG on SARS demonstrated the
19 Ibid.
20 WHO and some academic literatures (see for
example Mackenzie & Merianos) have different
numbers on the cases, death, and global coverage.
Thus, the table presents the minimum and maximum
numbers mentioned from different sources.
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leading role of the WHO in managing the
crisis. In terms of surveillance and
dissemination of knowledge, the WHO had
already cooperated with Canada under the
Global Public Health Intelligence Network
(GPHIN) since 1997. In essence, GPHIN is
an early warning system run by 10 experts
conducting observation and analysis based
on multilanguage database of news media
across countries.21 When outbreak emerged
in Guangdong in November 2002, GPHIN
already noticed this unusual occurrence, yet
China was uncooperative by keeping this
information both from the international
organizations and its own public.22 As the
WHO surveillance system identified another
outbreak in Guangdong on February 10, the
WHO disseminated this information through
its Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN). GOARN is a
collaboration of 110 technical and scientific
institutions under the leadership of the WHO
that was established in 2000 to provide rapid
response to an international outbreak. These
institutions include, among other, various
UN bodies, International NGOs such as
Medicine Sans Frontieres (MSF) and
MERLIN, the Red Cross, network of
laboratories, and scientific institutions from
member states.23 It is also through this
network that the WHO continuously worked
21 F. Tanguay, (2019, November 12), GHPIN Global
Public Health Intelligence Network, Retrieved April
2020, from WHO: https://www.who.int/ docs/default-
source/eios-gtm-2019-presentations/tang uay-phac---
eios-gtm-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=8c758734_2
22 D. Heymann & G. Rodier, (2004), SARS; F.C.
Goldizen, (2016), From SARS to Avian Influenza:
The Role of International Factors in China’s
Approach to Infectious Disease Control, Annals of
Global Health, 82(1), 180-188; Y. Huang, (2004),
The SARS Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A
Political Perspective, In S. Knobler, A. Mahmoud, S.
Lemon, A. Mack, L. Sivitz, & K. Oberholtzer,
Learning from SARS Preparing for the Next Disease
Outbreak, Washington, DC: National Academies
Press.
23 WHO(e). (n.d.). Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN). Retrieved April 2020,
from WHO: https://www.who.int/ihr/alert_and_
response/outbreak-network/en/
throughout the crisis period to conduct
studies on the causes, characteristics and
method to deal with the outbreak. It is only
one day after this initial information to
GOARN partners, which means three
months after the first outbreak, that China
eventually reported to the WHO, and even so,
the local government in Guangdong refused
to give access for the WHO to visit the
epicenter of the outbreak during its later visit
to China.24
As countries were unprepared for this
short notification of the outbreak, the disease
spread quickly to other countries. At this
stage, the WHO took over the role as a
global rule maker during the crisis, and thus
filling the third required response to an
outbreak. The WHO issued travel advisories
between March to June 2003 in keeping up
with the development of the spread of the
virus from merely spreading information to
international airlines on the symptoms of the
affected person to advice to postpone travels
to affected areas.25 WHO, in this regards,
also demonstrated its role as a single
authoritative information on the spread of the
virus and rule maker in prescribing and
proscribing behavior of actors during the
crisis. Even after the crisis, the WHO issued
“WHO Guidelines For the Global
Surveillance of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS)” and “WHO SARS Risk
Assessment and Preparedness Framework”
both aim to draw lesson from the outbreak
and to build better preparedness for any
possible reoccurrence.26 Interestingly,
International Labor Organization (ILO) also
24 F.C. Goldizen, (2016), From SARS to Avian
Influenza; D. Heymann & G. Rodier, (2004), SARS.
25 WHO, (n.d.), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) – Travel, Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/csr/sars/travel/en/
26 WHO, (2004a, October), WHO guidelines for the
global surveillance of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), WHO, Retrieved from
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO
_CDS_CSR_ARO_2004_1.pdf?ua=1;WHO, (2004b),
WHO SARS Risk Assessment and Preparedness
Framework,WHO.
Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi | Changes and Continuities in the Global Health
Governance of Coronaviruses
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.185-202.2020
192
issued a guideline responding to the spread
of the disease aims specifically for
workplace based on the request of ASEAN
countries amid fear on the impact of the
crisis to job losses and business closure in
the region.27 This, however, could be seen as
complementing and a proof of the adoption
of WHO’s regulation as the document clearly
stated its conformity with the WHO’s
regulation.
In regards to the financial and
material assistance, however, WHO was not
the key player. The World Bank Group (WB)
which has entered into the GHG in the 1980s
demonstrated its contribution by providing
financial assistance upon the request of
Chinese government. The economic impacts
of SARS was widespread, yet China
accounted for the 66% of global cases that it
sought financial assistance from the Bank to
finance its short term programs in dealing
with the outbreak, while at the same time
also build stronger health surveillance and
disease prevention in the longer term.28 This
financial assistance was co-financed by
Japan, UK, and Canada. In addition to this
program, INGOs such as Medicine Sans
Frontiere (MSF) also offered material
assistance in the form of training and
medical equipment for hospitals in China
and some other countries affected by the
27 ILO, (2004, March), SARS: Practical and
administrative responses to an infectious disease in




28 WHO, (2003, December 31), Summary of probable
SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November
2002 to 31 July 2003, Retrieved April 2020, from
WHO: https://www.who.int/csr/sars/
country/table2004_04_21/en/; World Bank, (2007,
June 29), Implementation Completion and Results
Report on Credit/Grant In the Amount of SDR 8.1
Million; US$ 8 Million to the People's Republic of




disease.29 At this point therefore, it could be
concluded that the GHG on SARS in 2003
has been dominated by few actors with the
WHO as the leading actor particularly for
surveillance and rule-making with
predominantly evidence-based scientific
approach in dealing with the crisis.
Meanwhile the World Bank complemented
WHO’s role as a traditional provider of
financial and material assistance for the
affected countries.
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) was a smaller scale coronaviruses
outbreak than SARS in 2003, yet it has
higher fatality rate and was still found until
December 2019 when the COVID 19, a
novel coronaviruses emerged in China. The
initial indication of this new virus was an
outbreak in Zarqa Public Hospital Jordan
where one nurse died and eight other staffs
suffered from respiratory illness.30 GPHIN
noticed this unusual occurrence and
informed all stakeholders within its
network.31 Received the same notification,
the European Centre for Disease Control and
Prevention (ECDC) made its own assessment
and asked WHO and US Centre for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) to follow up
the event.32 The Jordan Ministry of Health
also asked WHO for laboratory investigation
on this event, yet based on this testing, all
samples are negative for the existing
coronaviruses.33
29 MSF. (2003, May 23). MSF opens program in
China to help stop spread of SARS. Retrieved April
2020, from Medicine Sans Frontiere:
https://www.msf.org/msf-opens-program-china-help-
stop-spread-sars
30 D. R. Lucey, (2014), Still Learning From the
Earliest Known MERS Outbreak, Zarqa, Jordan, April
2012, Clinical Infectious Diseases, 59(9), 1234-1236.
31 M. Dion, P. AbdelMalik & A. Mawudeku, (2015,
September 3), Big Data and the Global Public Health
Intelligence Network (GPHIN), Canada
Communicable Disease Report, 41(9), 209-214.
32 D. R. Lucey, (2014), Still Learning From the
Earliest Known MERS Outbreak.
33 Ibid.
Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi | Changes and Continuities in the Global Health
Governance of Coronaviruses
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.185-202.2020
193
In June in the same year, a man
admitted to a hospital in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia suffered from similar symptoms.34 An
Egyptian national working in the hospital, Dr.
Ali Mohamed Zaki sent the sample for
further investigation to the Ministry of
Health.35 As no further follow up from the
government, Dr. Zaki sent the sample to Dr.
Fouchier at Erasmus Medical College in the
Netherland which later confirmed the new
virus.36 Dr. Zaki informed the government
and ProMED, a well-established open source
internet surveillance response program with
thousands of subscribers around the world to
fasten the spread of the information.37 In a
separate case in September, a Qatari man
with travel history to Saudi Arabia was
admitted to a hospital in the UK with
laboratory test showed more than 99%
similarity with the former case in Saudi
Arabia.38 Given the high probability of the
spread of the virus through international
travel, the British officials forwarded this
information to the WHO which then began
its operation and alert to member states.
Since the first case in 2012, there have been
837 cases and 291 deaths in 22 countries
until mid of 2014.39 South Korea became the
most affected country outside Saudi Arabia
with outbreak occurred in May 2015
resulting in 17,000 quarantined, 186
confirmed cases, and 36 deaths.40 The virus
34 J. Youde, (2015), MERS and Global Health
Governance, International Journal, 70(1), 119-136.
35 S. Davies, (2018), Reporting Disease Outbreaks in a
World with No Digital Borders. In C. McInnes, K.
Lee, & J. Youde, The Oxford Handbook of Global
Health Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 WHO, (2012, September 23), Novel coronavirus
infection in the United Kingdom. Retrieved April
2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2012_09_23/en/
39 J. Youde, (2015), MERS and Global Health
Governance
40 K. Kim, H. Yoon & K. Jung (2017), Resilience in
risk communication networks: Following the 2015
MERS response in South Korea, Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 25, 148-159.
continued spreading up to 2019 with WHO
reported 2,494 cases and 858 deaths until
November 2019.41 Even FAO still reported
an increase of 33 cases and 46 deaths in
February 2020.42
The GHG emerging during MERS
have similarities and differences with the
GHG on SARS. The main similarity is that
the WHO was still the leading actor in the
GHG on coronaviruses. However, there are
more actors joining the efforts in tackling the
disease and not to mention the changes in
international context during MERS. In
surveillance and dissemination of knowledge,
for example, GPHIN, has demonstrated
another success in early detection of the
outbreak in Jordan. The newly revised
International Health Regulations (IHR) also
gave the WHO a stronger surveillance
capacity as it requires member states to
report to the WHO on an outbreak of
infectious disease within its territory.
Member states are also required to develop
core capacity to conduct surveillance,
provide notification, verification, response,
and collaboration.43 British and Jordan’s
decision to report and to involve the WHO
on disease outbreak in their territory could be
partly explained as a result of growing
WHO’s power in surveillance mandated by
the IHR.
However, during this time, there were
also emerging non state actors particularly in
the forms of internet surveillance response
programs (ISRPs), such as ProMED who
could disseminate its surveillance findings
on infectious disease to 70,000 subscribers in
41 WHO, (2019a, March 11), Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Retrieved April
2020, from WHO: https://www.who.int/en/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/ middle-east-respiratory-
syndrome-coronavirus-(mers-cov)
42 FAO, (2020, February 19), MERS-CoV Situation
Update, Retrieved from FAO:
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres
/mers/situation_update.html
43 WHO, (2005), International Health Regulations
(2005) (Third Edition), Geneva: WHO.
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185 countries.44 This was proven in the case
of MERS in Saudi Arabia when Dr. Zaki
forwarded the information on the new virus
to ProMED which then contributed to earlier
detection on cases of MERS around the
world. However, while the IHR also gives
access for non-state actors to report directly
to the WHO of a disease outbreak, there was
impression that this non-state type of report
have been in some cases overlooked both by
the WHO and the government in individual
country which perhaps to some extent
signaled the desire of the WHO to maintain
its central place in the coordination of
surveillance activities.45
In the rule making response, WHO
also demonstrated, and ideally demonstrate,
a strong if not stronger role as an
international rule-maker as it was equipped
with the newly revised IHR which provides
guidelines and regulations that states have to
follow in the global health governance on
infectious disease. Under the IHR, the WHO
also convened the IHR Emergency
Committee who are tasked to offer technical
recommendation to the WHO.46 The EC
conducted regular meetings from 2013 to
2015 which became the basis for the WHO
to determine the status level of MERS and to
issue advices to various stakeholders at all
level.47 The meeting of the EC also became
an additional surveillance and knowledge
dissemination tools of the WHO as it
gathered experts and actors from the affected
countries to formulate the policies.
Perhaps the stark changes in the way
the WHO lead the rule making, and also
surveillance activities, is that it adopted a
44 Davies, (2018), Reporting Disease Outbreaks in a
World.
45 Ibid.
46 WHO, (2013, July 9), Middle East respiratory




47 WHO(f), (n.d.), IHR Emergency Committee
concerning Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus, Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/ihr/ihr_ec_2013/en/
more collective leadership with the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE).48 As MERS is a zoonotic disease
comes from animal, collaborating with FAO
and OIE is important in understanding the
characteristics and transmission of the
disease and to develop a well-informed
policy and guidelines on this disease.49 The
three organizations regularly held technical
meetings, and in 2009, issued A Tripartite
Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in
Countries which updated the previous
guidelines on similar matter.50 One persistent
problem in WHO’s rule-making behavior
even after the revised IHR was its inability to
force compliance and transparency among
member states, or at least from the origin
country of the disease. It took three months
for China to eventually report to the WHO
on the outbreak of SARS. Saudi’s dismissal
of Dr. Zaki’s report and its lack of
transparency on its handling of the disease
also delayed the response to the disease and
could set negative precedence for any
individuals/non state actors reporting cases
in particular state as their action might have
serious risk for their personal security.51
Lastly, in terms of financial and
material assistance, there were only few
actors involved as MERS had smaller scale
than SARS and 80% of its cases were from
Saudi Arabia. Among the existing actors,
GOARN was perhaps among the few that
contributed to provide material assistance
48 WHO, (2019b, March 11), Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV): Key facts,




49 FAO-OIE-WHO MERS Technical Working Group.
(2018). MERS: Progress on the global response,
remaining challenges and the way forward. Antiviral
Research, 159, 35-44.
50 Ibid.
51 Davies, (2018), Reporting Disease Outbreaks in a
World.
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through its deployment to Tunisia in 2013.52
The World Bank also has Pandemic
Emergency Financing Facility which include
MERS, yet there is information on the state,
if any, who take advantage of this facility.53
Thus, it can be said at this point that similar
with SARS, GHG on coronaviruses during
MERS was still dominated by the WHO with
its evidence-based scientific approach. Few
changes was unavoidable to response to the
changing international context in those years.
GHG during The COVID-19 Pandemic
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper,
the COVID-19 pandemic has far more cases,
deaths, and global coverage than SARS and
MERS. While it has lower fatality rate so far
compared to MERS, COVID-19 is highly
transmissible and thus it gains fertile ground
to spread widely in the current environment
which has far more intense transactions and
mobility of goods, people, and services
across countries. This is not to mention the
advanced information technology which in
the one hand help to promote transparency,
but in the other hand created more panic and
noise among people around the world. The
emerging GHG during the COVID-19
pandemic, therefore, involves more actors as
it is impossible for the WHO with the current
resources to handle the pandemic alone given
the health, social, and economic impact of
the pandemic.
The beginning of the pandemic could
be traced back to December 31, 2009 when
the WHO’s office in China received
notification on an outbreak of pneumonia in
Wuhan, Hubei Province.54 Based on the
52 J.S. Mackenzie et.al., (2014), The Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network, Global Public Health,
9(9), 1023-1039.
53 World Bank, (2017, May 9), Pandemic Emergency
Financing Facility: Frequently Asked Questions,




54 WHO, (2020d, January 20). Novel Coronavirus
(2019-nCoV) SITUATION REPORT – 1, Retrieved
April 2020, from WHO:
laboratory investigation on January 7, this
outbreak was caused by a novel coronavirus
more likely emerged from a local seafood
market. China shared this genome sequence
on January 12 which could help detect
similar cases and which apparently soon be
found in Thailand the next day (January 13),
Japan on January 15, and Korea on January
20.55 By the end of January, this number
increased to 9,826 cases of which 9,720 are
from China and 106 are from outside China.
This composition changed dramatically
however, as on April 8, China accounted for
only 6% of the total global cases (83,157 out
of 1,353,361), meaning that this disease has
widely spread around the world which
collectively share more than 90% of the
cases with no sign of leveling out yet during
the time of this writing.56
Given this unprecedented scale of the
pandemic, there are quite significant changes
in the existing GHG compared to the past
coronaviruses. In terms of surveillance and
knowledge dissemination, WHO has
strengthened its surveillance system with
GPHIN is currently collaborating with
ProMed and HealthMap under the Epidemic
Intelligence from Open Source (EIOS)
initiative. EIOS has identified the outbreak
of pneumonia in Wuhan on December 31,
and perhaps it is also from this notification
that the WHO office received information on
the outbreak on the same date.57 On January
2, WHO activated its incident management
system as a standardized approach adopted
by the WHO in responding to emergency





56 WHO, (2020c, April 8), Coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) Situation Report – 79, Retrieved April
2020, from WHO: https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronavi ruse/situation-reports/20200408-
sitrep-79-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=4796b143_6
57 WHO(d), (n.d.), Epidemic Intelligence from Open
Sources (EIOS), Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/eios
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main areas i.e. leadership, partner
coordination, information and planning,
health operations and technical expertise,
operations support and logistics, and finance
and administration.58 WHO also activated its
R&D blueprint to begin its R&D activities
on the possible vaccine and drug for the
virus.59 In disseminating the knowledge, the
WHO uses a new platform named WHO
Information Network for Epidemic (EPI-
WIN).60 In essence, the WHO is now better
equipped with the information system and
collaboration with various actors in
conducting surveillance and knowledge
dissemination. The presence of other non-
state actors both global and local, such as
Worldometer and KawalCOVID19 in
Indonesia, in reporting cases also strengthen
transparency and accountability which are
important in time of crisis.
In the area of rule-making, the WHO
is still the leading actor in responding to the
crisis. When the disease emerged, the WHO
activated Emergency Committee under the
IHR as it did during MERS. It was this EC
who then determined the changing status of
the disease as to whether it is categorized as
public health emergency of international
concern and whether there have been
sufficient evidences to raise the level of the
outbreak to pandemic level. The EC also
offers recommendation on WHO’s public
advice for general public and technical
guidance for more specific groups at the
58 WHO, (2017), Emergency Response Framework
(Second Edition), Geneva; WHO, (2020e, January 25),
Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) SITUATION




59 WHO(h), (n.d.), R&D Blueprint, Retrieved April
2020, from WHO: https://www.who.int/
blueprint/about/en/
60 WHO, (2020f, January 31), Novel
Coronavirus(2019-nCoV) Situation Report – 11,




national and local levels.61 One of the most
notable advice which could be said a new
international norm during this pandemic is
WHO’s norm of social distancing. It is
perhaps one important aspect which are often
underestimated as many observers often
criticized international organizations,
including the WHO, for its inability in
offering material assistance to affected
countries and its ineffectiveness in forcing
member states’ compliance. While the critics
is justified as, for example, the WHO does
not have capacity to force member states to
close their borders simultaneously, this
critics disregards the limited resources and
competencies transferred by member states
to the organization. In addition, their
emphasis on material role of an international
organization also underestimate their
normative role in setting the norms to be
followed during crisis. Norms could not
force compliance, but it helps setting
guidelines for the society to prevent further
spread of the virus particularly in a state
whose government does not act sufficiently
to contain the virus.
Lastly, in the area of providing
material and financial assistance, there is a
significant change as the WHO demonstrates
a strengthened presence in this area, but at
the same time there are far more numbers of
actors joining the efforts. In the previous
coronaviruses occurrence, the WHO offered
limited material assistance as the preceding
two occurrence were smaller and need no
international intervention. During this
pandemic, however, the WHO not only
works closely with GOARN in providing
technical assistance in affected countries, but
also other key partners, such as Global
Health Cluster, Standby Partnerships, and
Emergency Medical Teams (WHO(g),
61 WHO(a), (n.d.), Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
Pandemic, Retrieved April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/ novel-
coronavirus-2019
Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi | Changes and Continuities in the Global Health
Governance of Coronaviruses
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.185-202.2020
197
n.d.) .62 It also clearly stated that it requires
US$675 millions for meeting the Strategic
Preparedness and Response Plan which
includes material assistance in the form of
medical equipment, knowledge
dissemination, and technical assistance in the
form of clinical management capacity
building.63 In addition to releasing its
Contingency Fund for Emergency, the WHO
also collected donation in the form of
COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund to
meet this required amount. Interestingly, this
donation shows the significant contribution
from non-state actors such as Gates
Foundation, Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), Holy See, King
Baudouin Foundation, and Vital Strategies
which also signifies their positive support in
strengthening the role of the WHO in
tackling the pandemic.64
WHO’s assistance, however, focuses
on material assistance, and thus as the
pandemic began to affect global economy,
key international financial institutions also
offer their contribution in filling the gap of
providing financial assistance to affected
countries. The World Bank, for example,
offers long term and fast-track financial
support up to $160 millions and $14 billions
respectively.65 While the first was dedicated
for the public sector, the later include $8
billion funding from the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) to help private
companies.66 Development banks at the
62 WHO(g), (n.d.), Partners and Networks. Retrieved
April 2020, from WHO:
https://www.who.int/emergencies/partners
63 WHO (b), (n.d.). COVID-19 Response Fund,




65 World Bank, (2020a, February 11), How the World
Bank Group is helping countries with COVID-19




66 WHO, (2020b, April 8), Coronavirus (COVID-19),
Retrieved from WHO: https://who.sprinklr.com
regional level, such as ADB and AIIB in
Asia also offer their assistance. The ADB
has technical assistance grants for the public
sector as much as $2 million for China and
the Mekong subregion and another $2
million for developing member countries in
general.67 For the private sector, the ADB
offers $18.6 million short-term loan
mechanism. Meanwhile, the newly
established AIIB is currently proposing a
total of $5 billion Crisis Recovery Facility
both for private and public sectors of the
member countries.68
The IMF as the leading institution
tasked with maintaining global economic
stability, also offers five main mechanism to
help countries suffering from negative
balance of payment, capital outflow,
companies’ bankruptcy and unemployment
as a result of the pandemic. These
mechanism include emergency financing in
the form of Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) for
the poorest countries and Rapid Financing
Instrument (RFI) for all member countries,
debt relief grant for the poorest countries,
financing under the existing program, new
financing arrangement, and capacity
development.69 As of April 9, however, there
are more than 90 countries applying to the
estimated $50 billions available emergency
financing in the IMF at the same time which
means more partnership needed to meet this
demand.70 Last but not least, the G20 as the
67 ADB, (n.d.), COVID-19, Retrieved April 2020,
from ADB: https://www.adb.org/what-we-
do/covid19-coronavirus
68 AIIB, (2020, April 3), AIIB Looks to Launch USD5
Billion COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility, Retrieved
April 2020, from AIIB: https://www.aiib.org/en/news-
events/news/2020/AIIB -Looks-to-Launch-USD5-
Billion-COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility.html
69 IMF, (2020a, March 2), How the IMF Can Help
Countries Address Economic Effects of Coronavirus -






70 IMF, (2020b, April 9), The IMF's Response to
COVID-19, Retrieved April 2020, from International
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grouping of the 20 biggest economy in the
world, also announced their commitment to
contribute to fill the financing gap in the
WHO, and with close cooperation with the
IMF and the World Bank Group, committed
to contribute $5 trillion rescue package to
deal with the economic impact of the
pandemic.71 The pledge by the G20 gives not
only significant financial resources to fight
against the pandemic but also a symbol of
major powers’ support for international
institutions. G20’s successful record in
dealing with the 2009 global financial crisis
has also increased expectation for this
grouping to repeat the same success during
this pandemic. The overwhelming number of
actors in providing financial assistance,
however, has shifted the dominant approach
in framing the crisis from the evidence-based
scientific approach to economic approach.
Conclusion
This paper begin with the goal of
examining changes and continuities in terms
of actors and policies of the global health
governance on coronaviruses that is expected
to better understand the available tools, their
characteristics, and the extent they meet the
required response of a pandemic. Based on
the elaboration of this paper, there are
several conclusion that could be drawn from
this study. First, GHG on coronaviruses is
different from GHG on other infectious
diseases and thus deserve a separate study.
Second, GHG on coronaviruses is very
dynamic as there are continuity and changes
in terms of actors and the dominant approach
from SARS, MERS, to COVID-19. Third, in
each occurrence, the contribution of actors
Monetary Fund: https://www.imf.org/
en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19
71 G20 Information Centre, (2020, March 26),
Extraordinary G20 Leaders' Summit: Statement on
COVID-19, Retrieved April 2020, from G20
Information Centre University of Toronto:
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-
statement-0326.html
and policies to the required responses during
pandemic could be seen in three aspects: 1)
surveillance and knowledge dissemination, 2)
financial and material assistance both for
emergency and long term purposes, and 3)
rule making behavior. Based on these
parameter, this research shows that in terms
of surveillance, knowledge dissemination,
and rule-making behavior, WHO has
consistently demonstrated its leading role
from SARS, MERS, to the COVID-19.
However, while WHO’s role in surveillance
has been strengthened by the participation of
non-state actors and the advanced of
information technology, WHO’s role as a
rule maker do not become stronger even
though it has been equipped with the IHR.
WHO’s rule making behavior remains
limited to producing soft law/norms in
responding the crisis. In terms of financial
and material assistance, WHO has
demonstrated stronger presence in providing
material assistance during the COVID-19
compared to the past coronaviruses
outbreaks. Yet, provision of financial
assistance is still dominated by financial
institutions. Particularly during the COVID-
19 pandemic, there are overwhelming
number of actors in this area which then
shifted the dominant approach in framing the
coronaviruses outbreak from previously
dominated by scientific approach to more
economic dominated approach. While
mitigating the economic impact of the
pandemic is important, there must be equal
tools in the other aspects because economic
measure will be less effective if the
pandemic itself is still unresolved.
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